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As both the Midwest and U.S. econo-
mies continued to struggle during
2003, especially in manufacturing,
pointed questions were raised about the
continued viability of the U.S. manu-
facturing sector. U.S. manufacturing
employment had peaked long ago, in
1998; manufacturing output had
peaked in late 2000 or early 2001. The
contrast in performance between the
early 2000s and the mid-1990s is striking.
At that time, U.S. manufacturing’s
performance was seen as undergoing
gradual change and transition rather
than any profound structural decline.
And in the Midwest, manufacturing
performance had been celebrated for
its remarkable turnaround from the
early 1980s. In fact, the comeback in
Midwest manufacturing appeared to
have brought the region’s economy to
the verge of work force shortage and
re-found prosperity. This landscape
has changed significantly since then.
In September 2003, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Chicago convened the first in
a series of conferences to ask the fol-
lowing three difficult questions about
performance of the manufacturing
sector nationally and, especially, in the
Midwest.1 First, what are the long-term
underlying trends in manufacturing
and have they fundamentally changed
in recent years? Second, is the poor
performance of recent years a transitory
phenomenon—that is, is it the result
of a confluence of conditions and events
that will eventually dissipate, allowing
manufacturing to return to its long-run
trend? And, third, what are the chal-
lenges and prospects for Midwest man-
ufacturing going forward?
In this report, we summarize the infor-
mation gathered at these conferences
and offer several conclusions—albeit
tentative ones. The goals of the project
were declared at the outset to be explor-
atory and informative rather than de-
finitive. It will be several years before we
can say with any certainty whether U.S.
(and Midwest) manufacturing has fun-
damentally shifted in direction and
structure. This uncertainty is due in some
degree to the effects of global recession,
the September 11 attacks, the war in
Iraq, and other events. Nonetheless,
even tentative conclusions may be helpful
in shaping the policy alternatives avail-
able for manufacturing.
Note that this report represents our in-
terpretation of the issues raised and the
information provided, rather than any
consensus reached by the conference
participants.2 Chicago Fed Letter  Midwest Manufacturing Project  February 2005
1. Manufacturing output and employment
SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and




With these caveats in mind, we offer the
following summary of the challenges
and prospects for manufacturing in
the Midwest. The Midwest economy
remains highly concentrated in manu-
facturing relative to the remainder of
the U.S. economy. In an earlier “Midwest
Assessment” study, we found that man-
ufacturers had set the region’s employ-
ment and income on an improved growth
path during the late 1980s and early
1990s. Manufacturing performance and
the household incomes of midwesterners
continue to be closely tied together.
Because the Midwest economy remains
concentrated in manufacturing, it has
been profoundly affected by the recent
softness in U.S. and global manufactur-
ing performance. However, the Midwest
is not getting left behind as it did during
the structural changes of the early 1980s,
when much of the nation’s manufactur-
ing embraced high-tech and defense.
Now, the Midwest’s manufacturing per-
formance looks much like that of the
nation; this bodes well for the region
as the nation and the world begin to
experience renewed general econom-
ic vigor and manufacturing recovery.
For the nation, the recent manufacturing
experience does not necessarily reflect
a structural decline in manufacturing.
Transitory factors, such as slow world
economic growth and domestic over-
stocks in capital goods and production
capacity from the 1990s, have weighed
heavily on U.S. manufacturing during





be one of recovery.
Nonetheless, the
Midwest region con-
tinues to be chal-
lenged by the long-
term transformation
of its out-sized indus-
trial base toward a
service- and informa-
tion-oriented econo-
my. Both the U.S.
and Midwest contin-
ue to produce more
manufactured goods and more sophis-
ticated products, but they do so with a
flat or shrinking manufacturing work
force. Although this phenomenon
builds a higher standard of living, it
places two pressure points on the Mid-
west relative to other U.S. regions with
respect to growth and prosperity. In
particular, the remaining manufactur-
ing firms and industries must remain
as healthy and vibrant as possible. At
the same time, owing to labor-saving
productivity gains in existing manufac-
turing and a higher job concentration
in manufacturing, the Midwest economy
must grow into successful service sectors
at a more rapid pace than the nation.
Otherwise, at a minimum, the region’s
growth will tend to lag, with ongoing
pressures on wages and business profits.
Is the Midwest prepared to meet the
challenges ahead?
Structures, partnerships, and formal
institutions for crafting and implement-
ing regional policy responses are lack-
ing. Existing policy proposals tend to
fall into five broad categories:
• Federal strategies focused on fair
trade issues, health care, and pen-
sion reform;
• Cost-reduction strategies focused
on state and local tax burden and
regulatory reform;
• Value-added strategies geared toward
improving manufacturing efficiency
through adaptation of technology,
improved education, and better
infrastructure;
• Work force strategies aimed at im-
proving the skills of the existing
work force; and
• Institutional strategies aimed at




Until 2000, U.S. manufacturing perfor-
mance had been robust or at least be-
nign since the 1970s—on average, of
course. Similarly for the Midwest, un-
til the year 2000, manufacturing had
not led the region into recession since
the early 1980s. Although there was
much upheaval and variation across
individual industries and market seg-
ments during the 1990s, overall U.S.
real output in manufacturing rose
rapidly through most of the decade
(figure 1). From the beginning of 1990
to the peak during mid-2000, real out-
put climbed 63%, or an annual average
of 3.5%, despite a sluggish beginning
to the decade with the recession of
1990–91. And unlike many previous
U.S. recessions, the 1990–91 episode
was not magnified in manufacturing
sectors. Rather, to a greater extent than
before, imbalances associated with
real estate lending and construction,
the savings and loan crisis, the defense
build-down, and uncertainty over the
Gulf War characterized that recessionary
period. So, manufacturing fared rela-
tively well during the 1990–91 recession.
Peak to trough, manufacturing output
declined only 5%, and the level of
production had regained its former
peak just two years later. Manufactur-
ing employment, too, fell by only 5%,
though it remained mostly flat through-
out the decade and did not approach
its former peak again until early 1998.
The strength and length of the 1990s
manufacturing expansion contrast stark-
ly with the 2000–03 period. For the na-
tion, manufacturing output began its
descent half a year before the recession
of 2001, dropping 7% by the end of
2001. By mid-2004, real manufactur-























manufacturing is over three-quarters
more concentrated in the region than
the nation (figure 4), especially in basic
industrial equipment and the automo-
tive industry. The auto industry by itself
is almost eight times more concentrat-
ed in the Midwest than in the remain-
der of the U.S. On the other end of the
spectrum, computer and electronic com-
ponents are not well represented. In
terms of nondurable manufacturing, the
Midwest is 25% more concentrated than
the nation—heavily represented in food
processing, furniture, chemicals, and
paper; while textiles and apparel factor
much less into the region’s industrial
composition.
Against the backdrop of the good times
that the region enjoyed over the 1990s
and the difficult early years of the current
decade, we ask the following questions:
What are the region’s manufacturing
prospects; and have manufacturing
trends shifted permanently?
Why is manufacturing shrinking?
The issue of whether a structural break
in the direction of overall manufactur-
ing has taken place early in this new
millennium is difficult to settle because
of several overlapping and coincident
changes taking place in the economy.
Among the most important of these
changes, manufacturing companies have
been outpacing services in productivity
gains, thereby contributing to a shrink-
ing share of activity represented by
manufacturing—especially manufactur-
ing jobs—in the overall U.S. economy.
A secondary effect of the rising pro-
ductivity in manufacturing has been to
dampen the overall economic activity
and income growth in the regions that
have heavy concentrations of manufac-
turing. Though real manufacturing
output is rising, softer prices and en-
hanced productivity are limiting pay-
checks and other income accruing in
manufacturing regions. A further com-
plication concerns the organizational
structure and internal processes of U.S.
manufacturing companies. Many of
these companies have continued to
2. Change in payroll employment  (2000:Q4–04:Q2)
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
Percent change Change in jobs (‘000s)
Manufacturing Total Manufacturing Total
Illinois –17.5 –4.0 –150.7 –241.9
Indiana –12.8 –2.3 –83.8 –70.0
Michigan –20.3 –6.2 –180.8 –288.7
Ohio –18.0 –4.2 –182.1 –237.1
Wisconsin –13.3 –0.6 –78.3 –15.8
East North Central –16.9 –3.9 –675.7 –3.9
Iowa –12.2 –2.2 –30.7 –33.0
Seventh District –16.2 –3.6 –524.2 –649.4
U.S. –16.4 –0.9 –2,811.7 –1,172.7
3. Manufacturing as a percentage of total employment
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.
peak of four years before. Employment
trends were much worse. Payroll employ-
ment in manufacturing fell by 8% in
2001 and had lost another 8% by the
end of 2003. By this time, on net, pay-
roll employment had fallen three mil-
lion below its previous peak.
In the Midwest, manufacturing has also
fared badly, and the resulting impact on
the Midwest economy has been acute.
That is because the Midwest economy
has sustained its historic concentration
in manufacturing, so that the propor-
tionate downturn in the sector (versus
services) became a disproportionate
downturn for the region’s economy.
Led by manufacturing, total payroll job
losses across all sectors in the Midwest
fell by 3.6% over the period, compared
with 0.9% for the U.S. overall (figure 2).
The Midwest states—Illinois, Indiana,
Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin—are
among the most heavily concentrated
in manufacturing (figure 3). Though
manufacturing activity has been shift-
ing west and especially southward, In-
diana, Wisconsin, and Michigan still
rank among the top five nationally in
manufacturing output concentration.
A ranking of the nation’s top ten would
also include neighboring Iowa. Iowa’s
relative economic concentration in man-
ufacturing has been growing significant-
ly since the 1970s, while Indiana, Ohio,
Michigan, and Wisconsin have main-
tained their status (figure 4). Illinois’s
concentration in manufacturing has
been declining, as the Chicago area has
shed production activity in favor of busi-
ness, transportation, and distribution ser-
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evolve organizationally and operation-
ally in ways that make it increasingly
difficult to distinguish manufacturing
from service sector production. Finally,
of course, U.S. manufacturing is recov-
ering from the effects of a worldwide
economic slowdown that lowered de-
mand for manufacturing products.
Among these crosscurrents, strong pro-
ductivity gains within manufacturing
companies have surely been the most
dominant and durable in the U.S. Since
1950, nonfarm output per hour of work
has been rising by about 2% per year,
while manufacturing output alone has
been rising even faster—at a rate of
2.8%.2 Using statistical methods that
take into account improvements in
product quality and changing product
features, the output of manufacturing
companies is reported to continue to
run far ahead of prices. That is to say,
prices per standardized unit of output
have generally been falling across most
manufactured goods. Because household
consumption and sales do not respond
sharply to falling prices and rising in-
comes, we expect to observe a falling
share of manufacturing activity in the
U.S. economy. Similarly, the consump-
tion share of U.S. agricultural commodi-
ties has generally fallen over most of U.S.
history in tandem with strong produc-
tivity gains (and falling prices). In overall
manufacturing, there has been a rising
secular demand for some categories of
durable goods—especially autos and
consumer electron-
ics. This demand has
acted as a counter-





even as the consump-
tion share of other
goods such as cloth-




tured goods, most of
which in turn, be-
come embedded in
consumer services.
Nonetheless, the share of nominal
gross domestic product (GDP) arising
from manufacturing production fell
from a high of 32% in the early 1940s
to approximately 13% in 2003. All the
while, due to rising productivity, year to
year “real” output growth in manufac-
turing has met or exceeded that of the
remainder of the economy. This ap-
parent paradox arises because we are
producing more goods with less effort,
freeing much of our work force to
concentrate on producing services.
Such gains in productivity and falling
prices of manufactured goods translate
into rising standards of living for U.S.
individuals and households. Since 1940,
real household incomes have risen on
average 88% in the U.S.; even the oft-
maligned real hourly wage in goods-
producing industries has risen 23% (on
average) since 1964. Of course, averages
belie some often-significant differences
across income groups, skill levels, and
geographic regions. Over the past 25
years, for example, relative wages have
been rising more rapidly on average for
workers with college degrees than for
those without.
And differences across geographic re-
gions have also shifted. Generally, in-
come has risen more rapidly in the
formerly agriculture-dependent but
recently industrializing southern re-
gions than in the traditional industrial
Northeast and Midwest. In addition to
its eroding influence on relative incomes,
the secular fall in manufacturing as a
share of economic activity has also con-
tributed to lagging population growth
in the Northeast and Midwest.
All of these changes confuse the nar-
rower issue of whether the manufac-
turing downturn beginning in 2000
represented a “structural break with the
past,” or is just part of the ongoing,
generally beneficial, evolution of the
U.S. economy.
Moreover, organizational changes in
manufacturing companies have also
confused the issue, as manufacturing
companies have outsourced or divested
service activities that were formerly
performed within their organizations.
We commonly but mistakenly think of
manufacturing as production activity
alone. The Department of Commerce—
the source of most of our primary
measures of aggregate manufacturing
activity—defines manufacturing to be
the mechanical or chemical transfor-
mation into new products, as well as
assembly of component parts or prod-
ucts. Such activities are usually carried
on in plants, factories or mills using
power-driven machines or material
handling equipment.4 However, manu-
facturing companies also commonly
engage in service activities in the pro-
cess of ultimately putting their manu-
factured products out the door. Such
service activities include maintenance
of machinery, accounting, manage-
ment, marketing, legal and back office
work, logistics, transportation, sales,
customer assistance, and research and
development (R&D), among others.
Over time, the direct payrolls of manu-
facturing companies have shifted to-
ward employees in service occupations,
whether due to greater labor-saving ef-
ficiencies and/or to the changing na-
ture of the particular manufacturing
products we consume.
We can observe these shifts, albeit imper-
fectly, from employment data collected
by the U.S. Department of Labor, which
subdivides payroll workers of manufac-
turing establishments into “production”
versus “nonproduction” classifications.5
This classification is not a pure reflection
of employment by type of activity but
4. Manufacturing concentration vs. U.S.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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in earnest, manufacturing firms were
more inclined to use temporary work-
ers than to fill permanent positions.
This “hidden” part of the work force
contributes to mismeasurement of the
U.S. manufacturing sector.7
Structural change
Evidence from the labor market
If we accept that the above trends are
part of the long-term evolution of the
manufacturing sector, next we ask wheth-
er there is anything in the recent re-
cession and recovery that suggests a
structural change? The depth and length
of the manufacturing downturn took
many by surprise and tended to bolster
the view that a structural break had
taken place—that break being the ac-
celerated erosion of manufacturing ac-
tivity in the U.S. economy. From the
middle of 2000 through the end of 2001,
real output in manufacturing dropped
by 7%. The sector also was slow to
emerge from the downturn, begin-
ning to recover markedly only in mid-
2003. U.S. manufacturing output has
just now regained its pre-recession level.
Over the course of the decline, the
manufacturing sector lost three mil-
lion jobs. Actually, U.S. manufacturing
payroll employment last peaked dur-
ing the first half of 1998, at 17.6 mil-
lion and was edging downward before
the recession of 2001. Manufacturing
employment did not bottom out until
the first quarter of
2004 (at 14.3 million).
More surprisingly, the
sector experienced
greater net job losses
after the recession of
2001 than it did dur-
ing the recession.
The persistence of the
slide added to the per-
ception of structural
change. For example,
Erica Groshen of the
Federal Reserve Bank
of New York argues that
structural change has
contributed to (or has
surely accompanied)
the economy’s weak
performance in generating net job
growth.8 She defines “structural job
losses” broadly as a situation where
workers are required to switch firms,
industries, skills, or location to regain
employment. As aggregate evidence,
Groshen has correlated each individu-
al industry’s employment growth dur-
ing the official recessionary period of
March 2001 to November 2001 with
the subsequent recovery period of No-
vember 2001 to January 2004. She finds
that those industries that suffered steep
rates of decline during the recent re-
cession tended to continue these de-
clines during the recovery period.
Further, this pattern of correlation con-
trasts markedly with earlier recession/
recovery experiences, when industries
that experienced cyclical job losses
during the formal recession tended to
reverse those losses during the recovery.
Is this evidence of a structural break
with the past? A look at the historical
performance of U.S. manufacturing
suggests that persistent net job losses
that outlast the formal period of na-
tional recession are not actually that
unusual (as shown in figure 5). In fact,
if we look at the previous recession of
1990–91, we find that manufacturing
employment peaked early in 1989 and
did not bottom out until late 1992.
A more comprehensive way of looking
at the data is to examine trends in em-
ployment shares rather than levels.
rather reflects worker characteristics
such as “hourly” versus “salaried” and
others. Thus, a manager of a production
activity might be classified as “nonpro-
duction,” while certain types of clerical
or maintenance occupations might be
classified as “production.” Still, subdivid-
ing employment by this classification
generally reflects the tendencies toward
more managerial and white-collar skilled
occupations and away from production
line jobs. In 1950, there were six produc-
tion workers for every single nonproduc-
tion worker employed by manufacturing
companies. This ratio had fallen to 2.4
production workers as of 2003.
Even while manufacturing companies
are themselves becoming more service
oriented, they also continue to outsource
service activities such as janitorial, re-
search, and accounting. This leads to
overstatement of the actual declines in
manufacturing output and employment,
because activities and “value added” for-
merly counted as performed by manu-
facturing companies are now attributed
to firms in the service sector. Comparing
the U.S. Census Bureau’s accounting of
value added by manufacturers (which
includes services purchased by manufac-
turers) with the estimate constructed by
the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA)
(which does not include purchased ser-
vices), gives us a sense of the importance
of this trend.6 The data indicate that
manufacturing companies purchased
$0.16 on “outside” services for every
$1 of manufacturing product in 1958,
but they spend $0.30 on such purchased
services today, amounting to $453 billion.
The estimated share for the Midwest
region is slightly more ($0.33 in every
$1 for 2000 for a total of $114 billion).
Another part of the outsourcing trend
is evident in the growth of the tempo-
rary help supply (service) industry.
Though still a small share of the labor
force (2.7% of total U.S. payroll em-
ployment in 2003), the percentage of
temporary workers has doubled since
1990. Some estimates put the number
of temporary workers in manufactur-
ing at one million by the end of the
1990s; and anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that during 2000–03, before the
current manufacturing recovery began
5. All employees: Manufacturing
NOTE:  Shaded bars indicate National Bureau of Economic Research
designated recessions.







1958 ’62 ’66 ’70 ’74 ’78 ’82 ’86 ’90 ’94 ’98 2002
January6 Chicago Fed Letter  Midwest Manufacturing Project  February 2005
This approach has the advantage of
normalizing the data across periods in
which overall underlying work force
and national output exhibit varying
trend growth. This approach reveals
that a very longstanding trend in the
U.S. is for the manufacturing sector’s
share of total payroll jobs to fall propor-
tionately each year (figure 6). During
a general economic downturn, this
loss temporarily tends to accelerate;
sometimes, though not always, manu-
facturing regains share during the
economic recovery stage of the busi-
ness cycle, before settling back to its
long-term average decline of 2%.
Chicago Fed economist Ellen Rissman
has taken the analysis of employment
shares several steps further.9 Rather than
using the officially declared recessions,
Rissman (re)bases the observed national
business cycle to an employment-based
cycle. In examining the behavior of
manufacturing’s employment share in
recent years, she finds little if anything
unusual in the sector’s behavior relative
to the remainder of the labor market.
This analysis of employment data sug-
gests that the secular trends in manufac-
turing have not changed fundamentally.
Still, the industry’s deep and extended
downturn has imposed significant dis-
location costs on large numbers of man-
ufacturing workers. For this reason,
further research is being conducted to
determine whether and the extent to
which manufacturing workers may be
more severely dislo-
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ly.10 But to conclusively settle the struc-
tural change question, researchers will
need firmer and more extended sets
of data with which to compare work
force experiences over time as well as
to point the way toward possible work
force interventions for dislocated
manufacturing workers.
Meanwhile, evidence from the nonman-
ufacturing labor market shows strong
parallels to manufacturing, which argues
against the manufacturing-specific
structural break interpretation of recent
events. Across the economy, payroll job
growth has been weak in relation to out-
put growth. Labor market economists
have offered many tentative theories
to explain this trend. One such theory
is that the advent of internet screening
and application processes and tempo-
rary staffing agencies has made it much
easier for firms to add workers only as
they are required.11 As a result, firms
don’t need to hire in anticipation of
future staffing needs, as they once did.
Alternatively, some analysts suggest
that the rising costs of taking on new
employees, associated with the rising
costs of health care and other benefits,
are encouraging firms to further delay
their plans to add workers. In addition,
some argue that uncertainty about the
future direction of the U.S. economy
is increasing firms’ reluctance to add
to payroll, especially so long as excess
production capacity and productivity
enhancements allow them to boost
output without hiring.
Understanding the decline in
manufacturing output
If declining manufacturing employment
is not unusual in relation to the business
cycle, why then has the cycle itself been
so painful; why has manufacturing out-
put decline been so deep and extended
over the past several years? A major rea-
son is that the 2001 recession and its
aftermath were marked by weak or de-
clining investment spending by business-
es located in the United States to a greater
extent than in most recessions. One con-
tributing factor to weak investment was
an over-accumulation in the nation’s
capital stock in the period leading up
to the recession. For most of the 1990s,
real investment in equipment and soft-
ware grew at rates of 10% to 15% annu-
ally, a rate unparalleled over the previous
four decades. This expansion contrib-
uted 1.0 percentage points to 1.5 per-
centage points to overall economic
growth during that period—at times
accounting for more than one-half of
the nation’s overall average GDP growth.
The ultimate deceleration of this spend-
ing was precipitous, beginning in mid-
2000, and contributed significantly to
the 2001 recession.
How unusual was this investment run-up
and subsequent falloff? If we examine
each U.S. recession since 1960 (see shad-
ed bars in figure 7), we find that it was
only in the 2001 recession that the in-
vestment sector was the sole part of the
economy to dip into negative territory.12
At the same time, the other sectors of
the economy continued to contribute
positively to economic growth. Strong
growth during the late 1990s—often
above the long-run sustainable growth
rate—added to investment demand as
the business sector struggled to add ca-
pacity to keep up with surging demand.
In addition, perceived extraordinary
investment opportunities in high-tech
industries gave rise to strong investment
demand for producing manufactured
goods. Some special circumstances also
contributed to an accelerated buildup
in some components of capital stock,
notably the millennium date change,
which motivated an accelerated over-
haul and replacement of software
(and hardware) systems throughout
the world.
6. Manufacturing share of total employment
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Following the initial adjustment to
over-investment, investment spending
remained extraordinarily weak, only
beginning to regain forward momentum
in 2003. Though the overall economy
began to grow at the end of 2001, events
such as September 11, corporate gover-
nance irregularities, and the imminent
conflict in Iraq all acted to dampen in-
vestor sentiment and to create a climate
of investor uncertainty. As these influ-
ences subside, the pace of investment is
reviving. Falling relative prices for com-
puting equipment and technological
advances have motivated investment in
information-processing goods. And re-
vived consumer spending on services is
helping to encourage investment by these
industries. The manufacturing sector’s
output has been growing rapidly, which
is ultimately expected to contribute to
revived investment in basic business equip-
ment and structures as existing manu-
facturing capacity becomes strained.
For the Midwest, there is a marked di-
chotomy in the current investment re-
vival; investment in high-tech goods is
strong, while investment in basic indus-
trial goods and equipment is weaker.
Explanations for this pattern are that
capacity utilization of the nation’s factory
base remains slack; there has not yet
been an extended period of overall
growth that will ignite renewed invest-
ment for factory capacity. At the same
time, technological goods and equip-
ment typically depreciate and become
obsolete much faster
than basic industrial
goods. For this rea-
son, firms and indus-
try sectors often have
little choice but to in-
vest in such goods if







spurred along in re-
sponse to strong labor-
saving and efficiency
gains that are now
possible for firms
(consistent with tepid net additions to
the work force). In any event, this pat-
tern of renewed investment has contrib-
uted to a slower pace of economic revival
in the industrial Midwest, with its con-
centration in basic equipment rather
than high-tech capital goods.13
Effects of globalization
Recent developments in the global econ-
omy have led many to argue that struc-
tural change is taking place, as U.S.
manufacturing production continues to
move overseas. Such conclusions are
often based on recent observations of
the U.S. balance of trade account, which
measures exports and imports of goods
and services.14  Coincident with recent
weakness in manufacturing employment
and output, the U.S. has been running
record or near-record deficits in its bal-
ance of trade with the rest of the world,
meaning that the value of goods and
services we import far exceeds that of
our exports. In particular, trade deficits
with China have surged, and now account
for approximately one-quarter of the
overall U.S. trade deficit with the world.
And while such deficits have expanded,
Asian nations—particularly Japan—have
intervened in international currency
markets in support of the U.S. dollar,
presumably as protection for home
production and exports during their
own unsteady economic recoveries.
Such actions have added to the im-
pression that an artificially supported
dollar has spurred imports to and imped-
ed exports from the U.S. In particular,
China’s policy of a nonconvertible cur-
rency and fixed exchange rate has been
identified by some as a culprit in sag-
ging U.S. manufacturing activity.15 At
the same time, some observers believe
that a weakening of trade barriers in
traded goods sectors such as manufac-
turing has contributed to “job flight”
from the U.S. overseas. Much of the
expansion of the U.S. deficit with China
has developed in the years following
China’s entry to the World Trade Organi-
zation (and its most-favored-nation sta-
tus) in 2001.
Josh Bivens of the Economic Policy
Institute16 finds that the downward pres-
sure on employment caused by surging
manufacturing productivity was mitigat-
ed by rising domestic demand over the
period 1998 to 2003. His estimates fur-
ther suggest that this leaves residual
changes in international trade account-
ing for an estimated 59% of the decline
in manufacturing jobs since 1998. Yet,
even if taken at face value, such shifts
and swings in the international accounts
do not necessarily indicate a fundamen-
tal structural break with the past, because
international influences themselves are
often transitory. Currency swings and
differences in cyclically related economic
growth among nations (which in turn
drive own-nation imports) often turn out
to be temporary. For example, the slow-
ing of U.S. exports abroad coincided
with a slowing of world economic growth
during the late 1990s following the
Asian and Russian currency crises. The
pace of global economic expansion
decelerated from 4.2% in 1997 to 2.5%
in 1998, while recovering to only 3.0% in
1999.17 In response, U.S. exports abroad
flattened out in the latter 1990s, even
while surging U.S. economic growth
continued to expand U.S. imports.
Such volatile rates of economic growth
in different geographical areas usually
dominate other factors affecting swings
in national exports and imports, such
as swings in exchange rates and changes
in trade agreements. In the late 1990s,
a strong dollar and weakening of foreign
currencies such as the yen and euro
7. Investment and economic growth
NOTE: Shaded bars indicate National Bureau of Economic Research designated
recessions.
SOURCE:  U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.
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did serve to accentuate the relative
growth forces that widened the U.S.
balance of trade. And subsequently, the
falling trade-weighted value of the dollar
from its peak in 2002 did add some tail-
wind to U.S. production via its effects on
export growth. However, the confluence
of various forces makes it uncertain how
much of the decline in Midwest and U.S.
manufacturing, and the recent recov-
ery, are actually due to changes in the
exchange rate of the dollar. The U.S. con-
tinued to be the world’s engine of growth
over the past two years, and this has
surely contributed to its rising imports.
As the rest of the world economy has
begun to revive, so have U.S. exports.
Aside from growth disparities and cur-
rency movements, what else might we
identify as a global market source of
structural change for American manu-
facturing? The obvious candidates are
shifts in the terms of trade (and com-
parative advantage) that reflect under-
lying cost and competitiveness conditions
of national production. For example,
low-wage, low-skill production activities
have long been shifting abroad out of
high-wage, high-skill nations such as
the U.S. However, these forces of change
have been ongoing in an evolutionary
fashion over many decades rather than
anything revolutionary of late and so
do not imply a structural break with the
past. J. Bradford Jensen of the Institute
for International Economics examines
the role of international trade in the
reallocation of U.S. manufacturing with-
in and across industries from 1977 to
1997.18 In particular, Jensen focuses on
imports into the U.S. from countries
characterized by low average wages in
their manufacturing sectors. These low-
wage countries, which include China,
India, Egypt, and many small nations on
the African continent, have wage levels
of 5% or less of the average U.S. wage.
He finds that imports from this cohort
grew from 2% of U.S. imports in 1972 to
15% of imports by 2002. Jensen also
demonstrates that the survival of U.S.
manufacturing plants and output and
employment growth are negatively as-
sociated with the share of U.S. imports
sourced from the world’s lowest-wage
countries.
Such patterns suggest
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nature of this process,
we note that in turn,
nations such as Ger-
many, Japan, Korea,
Singapore, and Taiwan
have first been the domicile of this
type of production and later, as their
economies have developed, ceded it to
lower-wage, less-developed countries.
And in the process, low standards of
living eventually give way to rising wag-
es internally. India and China have al-
ready begun moving in this direction.
The rapid rise of China over the past
15 years and the yawning 25% bilateral
imbalance of trade with the U.S. give
the appearance of a more rapid evolu-
tionary shift than the past. But this out-
ward statistical evidence is somewhat
misleading. Bilateral trade flows are not
strong indicators of fundamental im-
balance for two reasons. First, because
many trade flows are triangular across
many nations of the world, a simple na-
tion versus nation imbalance means
little. Second, as an indicator, a bilater-
al trade imbalance has become even
more deficient in recent years. That is
because production of any individual
product seldom takes place in a single
country, but is rather disaggregated into
many separate components whose pro-
duction locations are distributed across
nations according to specific national
specialization and cost of production
advantages. This deconstuction is often
termed “vertical specialization,” referring
to vertical dismembering into separate
and locationally distinct production
processes.19 Unfortunately, statistics on
trade flows do not record this reality,
but rather record and re-record (i.e.,
double-count) components of a final
good several times over as it flows across
national boundaries. In the case of China,
its vast work force and low wages have
encouraged Asian producers domiciled
in Japan and Taiwan and elsewhere to
selectively move stages of their produc-
tion process to China. For this reason,
when we see China’s sharply rising and
vast exports to the U.S., we are seeing
goods coming to the U.S that would
have formerly been exported directly
from other nations; and at the same
time, much of the imported good’s val-
ue was indeed created in other Asian
countries and ultimately shipped to the
U.S. following a way-station in mainland
China. Indeed, the share of U.S. im-
ports sourced from Asia as a whole has
remained steady or slightly declined
(figure 8).
China is too big to rely on export-led
growth to develop its economy, but
rather must develop internally if it is
to raise its standard of living.20 The most
expedient way to do this is to allow
Japanese, European, and U.S. firms into
the Chinese mainland to produce prod-
ucts for China’s domestic markets. Fur-
ther, this will mean imports of both
capital and capital goods into China to
equip factories and businesses. Midwest
manufacturing can aim to meet this
challenge by exporting the most sophis-
ticated capital equipment to Chinese
8. U.S. imports from Asia
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factories, hospitals, and service busi-
nesses.
Admittedly, many Midwest manufac-
turers, especially those lacking global
scope and sufficient depth to adjust
easily, are experiencing competitive im-
port pressure from facilities located in
China. But pressures are keenly felt in
many instances because general man-
ufacturing market conditions have re-
mained soft. On average, the Midwest’s
mainstay industries are somewhat less
exposed to import competition than
the nation’s.21
Regional developments
Another way in which structural change
(and structural breaks) can take place
is through geographic shifts, movement,
or migration in the location of indus-
trial activity. Recent shifts from the
Midwest have occurred as cost conditions
have changed and markets have moved
elsewhere. In some instances, entirely
new industries, such as aerospace and
micro-electronics, have arisen in regions
largely outside of the Midwest. Though
industries in micro-electronics and com-
puting, software, biotech, and aerospace
originated in the manufacturing belt
of the Northeast and Midwest, rapid
growth and investment during the 1980s
and 1990s took place elsewhere. High-
technology industries have distinctly
favored western states such as Texas,
Arizona, and California. In the early
1980s, defense-oriented manufacturing
favored such regions, while the Midwest
was also experiencing unfavorable terms
of trade with the rest of the world for its
capital goods exports—although the re-
gion reclaimed some lost share in the lat-
ter half of the 1980s and in the 1990s.
Auto industry shifts
Currently, a shift of the domestic auto-
motive industry away from the upper
Midwest toward the mid-South poses the
most likely structural threat to the region’s
economy. The automotive industry—
both automotive parts production and
assembly operations—is geographically
concentrated in the Midwest, and the
industry’s large size and broad scope
make its performance and location
critical to the continued stability of the
manufacturing sector here. The exact
size of the industry is difficult to deter-
mine because of the extensive and orga-
nizationally dis-integrated supply chains
that feed into final assembly of autos and
trucks. Long chains of parts suppliers
provide glass, rubber, steel, chemicals,
paints, technology, fasteners, and many
fabricated parts to auto assemblers (and
to each other) throughout the Midwest.
Many of these plants simultaneously
supply non-automotive parts and servic-
es as well. In the Great Lakes states of
Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and
Wisconsin, it is estimated that approxi-
mately one in six manufacturing jobs
can be accounted for by automotive
production(and this measure excluded
related production of basic inputs to
automotive such as fasteners, steel, paint,
etc.). In Michigan, 36% of manufactur-
ing employment is in automotive, while
in Indiana and Ohio, the share is 15%
to 16%.22 Within 400 miles of Detroit
(one day’s drive), 58% of the nation’s
assembly plants can be found, along with
84% of those major supplier plants owned
by auto assembly companies (“captives”),
and two-thirds of the major non-captive
“tier one” supplier plants.23
Until recently, new automotive invest-
ment had been assisting the Great Lakes
states to rebuild their national position
in manufacturing output and employ-
ment. Even though the locus of foreign
nameplate investment in the U.S. by
Nissan and Toyota was skewed somewhat
southward toward the mid-section of
the country, an offsetting trend was
the pull of domestic auto assembly op-
erations from coastal locations back to-
ward the nation’s midsection—including
the Midwest. Along with some signifi-
cant foreign direct investment in Ohio
(by Honda) and in Indiana (by Toyota
and Isuzu), a reconcentration of the
Big Three’s domestic operations had
boosted the region’s automotive share.
However, this trend appears to have
largely played out. Despite the use of
sizable sales incentives to spark vehicle
sales, the Big Three auto producers
have continued to lose market share
to foreign nameplates (i.e., vehicles
manufactured in the U.S. by foreign
companies, as well as foreign name-
plate vehicles imported to the U.S.).
The Big Three’s share of motor vehi-
cle sales fell from 72.4% in 1986 to
less than 60% in 2004 (figure 9).
The domestic assembly plants contin-
ue to be heavily concentrated in the
traditional auto production states in
the Midwest. However, the assembly
plants of foreign producers are con-
centrated in the southern end of the
auto corridor, notably Tennessee and
Kentucky (about 20% of all light vehicle
assembly plants, half of which are for-
eign producers). Automotive supplier
plants are also gravitating southward
toward the assembly plants because they
generally want to be within a day’s drive
9.  U.S. light vehicle sales: 1990–2004







1990 ’91 ’92 ’93 ’94 ’95 ’96 ’97 ’98 ’99 2000 ’01 ’02 ’03 ’04
Big Three Foreign nameplate, Domestic Imports10 Chicago Fed Letter  Midwest Manufacturing Project  February 2005
(about 400 miles) of their customers.
By one account, southern states now
host 33% of major auto parts plants.24
Has the geographic shift accelerated in
recent years? Market share of the Big
Three has been declining since the
mid-1990s. Before that time, innovative
models helped to support their market
share. Since then, foreign nameplates
have introduced many such vehicle
models themselves, so that competition
for market share has sharpened mark-
edly. However, the market share trend
may yet reverse itself. By 2007, the
domestic automakers will reportedly
have introduced 100 new models.25
What do current trends suggest? Until
recently, strong auto sales may have
masked the importance of the shift
southward in production. With the
economic expansion shifting some-
what from consumer expenditure to-
ward general investment spending,
the geographic impact is becoming
more apparent. Owing to its sharp
concentration in automotive, for ex-
ample, Michigan’s unemployment
stood stubbornly a full percentage
point above the nation’s in mid-2004.
Moreover, high inventories and low sales
were inducing production pullbacks
by major domestic auto makers during
the final two quarters of the year. If in-
tra-industry competition continues to
erode the Big Three’s market share,
and if sales continue to stagnate, losses
in assembly and supplier jobs will like-
ly be disproportionately concentrated
in the Midwest.26
Policy responses for the Midwest
The sharp contraction in manufacturing
employment associated with the 2001
recession led to a number of studies
(listed in the appendix) aimed at de-
veloping policies to improve manufac-
turing’s fortunes (figure 10). In the
broadest sense the studies tended to fo-
cus on two strategies. First was identify-
ing cost differentials faced by domestic
manufacturers and what policies could
ameliorate those costs. Second was pro-
ductivity enhancement, aimed at either
process or product innovation. For state,
local, and regional policy, the most
appropriate strategies would appear to
focus on examining the local costs borne
by manufacturers (in particular, whether
state–local tax structures tend to dis-
courage capital formation), while also
emphasizing work force development
and training programs that meet the
needs of local industries. In addition,
the role of supportive infrastructure is
key. For example, the efficiency of the
transportation infrastructure is critical
in supporting the shipment of manu-
facturing goods that are increasingly
time-sensitive. Importantly, emerging
competitors such as China often still
lag the U.S. in the ease and facility of
moving materials and final goods to
where they are needed.
Not surprisingly (given the U.S.’s rela-
tively high standard of living), many of
the cost disadvantages identified in the
studies reflect labor and benefit costs.
In particular, rising health insurance
costs and legacy costs related to pension
plans are seen as contributing to unit
labor costs that undermine the com-
petitiveness of U.S. firms. Unfair trade
practices, including intellectual property
right infringement, tariffs, and unfair
currency exchange rates are also identi-
fied as burdens facing U.S. companies.
In addition, some regulatory require-
ments, particularly related to different
standards for environmental compli-
ance contribute to higher domestic
costs for doing business. For the most
part, these issues are most effectively
dealt with through federal policies.
At the state and local level, work force
strategies appear particularly popular
with policymakers. The rationale is that
as firms produce more sophisticated
(and higher value-added) manufactur-
ing products using more sophisticated
production methods, workers’ skills
must grow in tandem. The criticism of
many work force programs has been a
tendency to avoid rigorous evaluations
of programs and a failure to design
programs that are aligned with em-
ployer needs.
One advantage that state and local poli-
cymakers have in designing policy is that
they are the closest to local firms and have
a better understanding of the drivers
of the local economy. A disadvantage
10.  Examples of proposed manufacturing policies
Value-added strategies
• Increase technical assistance programs
aimed at increasing manufacturing
productivity, in particular helping with process
innovation and technology transfer.
• Promote and maintain supportive public
infrastructure.
• Promote venture capital formation.
Work force/education strategies
• Increase federal funding for flexible job
training.
• Establish a high school and technical
education partnership initiative.
• Establish personal reemployment accounts.
• Improve services for displaced workers.
• Develop a training and education curriculum
in the context of industry standards and
employer requirements.
• Encourage skill certification.
Raising visibility of manufacturing issues
• Create government advocates for
manufacturing issues both within the U.S.
Department of Commerce and across other
agencies.
• Create mechanisms to coordinate federal,
state, and local policy for manufacturing.
• Conduct public education and outreach to
inform the public about the role of
manufacturing in the U.S. economy.
Federal policies
• Improve international trade conditions,
including preventing currency
manipulation, enforcement of World
Trade Organization rulings, protecting
intellectual property rights, eliminating
non-tariff barriers, and improving market
access.
• Increase federal support for the
Manufacturing Extension Program.
• Develop policies to contain health care
and pension costs.
• Diversify energy supply and improve
reliability.
Cost-reduction policies
• Examine state business tax structure,
particularly related to capital formation.
• Study changes to depreciation, the
effect of the alternative minimum tax,
research credits, and incentives to
increase U.S. savings rate.
• Bring U.S. statutory tax rates in line with
those of competitor nations.
• Create a cost–benefit review for any new
regulatory program.
• Legal reform, including limiting industrial
liability, class action suits, and asbestos
litigation.Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 11
is in their small scale and frequent in-
ability to gather global information as
it affects the local economy and its
companies. For one, state and local
economic development resources are
limited. Even well-designed state and
local programs often lack the scope
and scale to broadly influence indus-
try performance. In choosing among
potential policy alternatives, one guide-
line is to identify market failures and
fashion policies to correct the failures.
Why is it that some firms do not seem
to gain from trade? Examples of mar-
ket failures may include inefficiencies
in distributing information about new
markets and technologies, the inability
of firms to profitably conduct neces-
sary research and development with-
out the benefits spilling over to
competitors, insufficient or ineffective
worker training in the public sector, as
well as undeveloped capital markets.
Understanding the differences in re-
gional industry structure and compar-
ative advantage is also important. For
example, a study of Pennsylvania man-
ufacturers by Ned Hill of Cleveland
State University found that Pennsylvania
had a concentration of firms that pro-
duced lower-value-added products that
were particularly susceptible to import
competition. Policymakers may find it
useful to have such specific knowledge
of firm conditions to act effectively, if
for no other reason than to offer dislo-
cation assistance to workers and towns.
More proactive policy attempts to re-
place jobs and industries are perilous.
Efforts to try and attract the “next big
thing” in economic development should
usually be avoided. States and regions
facing declines in mature industries
such as manufacturing have often tried
(and failed) to attract high-technology
firms. Andrew Reamer of Andrew
Reamer and Associates demonstrates
that technological innovation tends to
be geographically concentrated in large
metropolitan areas and does not rep-
resent a particularly viable strategy for
many local economic development ef-
forts. For example, only 19% of U.S.
metropolitan areas specialize in tech-
nology development as measured by pat-
enting activity. The largest metropolitan
areas are responsible for 66% of all
patents and 43% of jobs related to
technology development. Such gener-
alizations concerning geography and
success may be helpful in fashioning
development programs and government
services that fit local advantages. But
policymakers also need to understand
their local industry structure. For ex-
ample, when a local economy is able
to capture a high-tech industry segment
such as R&D, it often fails to receive
the attendant benefits (i.e., jobs and
income) of the commercialization of
the innovation. In a global economy,
commercial production still largely
occurs at the lowest cost site.
Coordination of efforts among policy-
makers is also important. In Illinois, an
effort is underway to develop a shared
manufacturing strategy by the state’s
manufacturing association and a prom-
inent labor organization. And on an
institutional level, federal, state, and
local policies need to be more closely
aligned to ensure that actions taken by
one level of government are not con-
tradicted by policies implemented by
other governmental entities. For ex-
ample in tax policy, the purported
benefits that are anticipated through
special tax treatment, such as acceler-
ated depreciation and investment
credits, can be muted if state policy-
makers de-couple their tax structures
from the federal tax base.
Policy initiatives that would improve
manufacturing fortunes include encour-
aging a higher level of domestic savings
(for investment), supporting public in-
vestment in research and development
and public infrastructure, as well as pro-
moting a better educated and more
flexible work force.
Manufacturers can also adopt internal
policies that will improve their competi-
tiveness. For example, the Illinois Tooling
and Manufacturing Association has
identified several marketing and tar-
geting strategies to help its members.
These include marketing strategies,
such as diversifying a firm’s customer
base and reducing reliance on a single
large customer. In addition, firms can
develop a brand that helps identify the
special process or equipment that they
use, which in turn allows them to dif-
ferentiate themselves in the market.
Firms can also seek strategic alliances
with U.S. or foreign partners.
Targeting industries that are likely to
remain strong in North America is an-
other important strategy. Firms in tar-
get industries have several common
characteristics. In particular, they tend
to produce highly engineered products
that require capital-intensive and high-
skilled labor production. These products
are assembled from high-value-added
components, have technologically ad-
vanced applications, and require tight
engineering tolerances. An example
of such an industry would be medical
equipment. The advantage to serving
this type of industry is that active ser-
vice support and maintenance are re-
quired by customers. Such industries
require complex communication among
engineers and product managers and
need suppliers that are active partners.
They also tend to have products that
need to be frequently revised to remain
competitive. This allows local suppliers
to participate in both current and future
product development.
Conclusion
What are the barriers and challenges
to implementing policies that are ap-
propriate and helpful to manufacturing
in the Midwest? First and foremost,
knowledge, understanding, and atten-
dant education are not effectively mar-
shaled about manufacturing in a way
that galvanizes people and organiza-
tions to action. As this report shows,
manufacturing and the Midwest enjoy
a deep and enduring relationship. The
Midwest’s primary challenge is to fos-
ter manufacturing, while at the same
time helping its economy to evolve to-
ward higher paying service activities.
That an adequate amount of research
is not conducted nationally, regionally,
nor by any individual institution is
somewhat understandable, given the
geographic breadth and far-flung inter-
connections of manufacturing activities
in the region. Accordingly, greater co-
operation is needed between state and
local governments across the region,12 Chicago Fed Letter  Midwest Manufacturing Project  February 2005
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and conversations among the region’s
governments should begin to take
place so that mutually beneficial poli-
cies can be developed. This is all the
more compelling because manufactur-
ing production and related operations
are arrayed across state and local bound-
aries. For many manufactured products,
the supplier relationships in the produc-
tion process involve various plants and
offices located up to hundreds of miles
apart and sometimes strung together
by a patchwork network of transporta-
tion and communication. Indeed, in the
Midwest, the productive whole is more
than the sum of the parts. It is the co-
location of such facilities in the region
that makes its products competitive on
world markets. To support and develop
these manufacturing “clusters,” the in-
dividual locations must act in concert to
plan and maintain supporting infrastruc-
tures, such as road and rail networks,
along with work force training and skills
certification, and perhaps some forms
of technical assistance and R&D.
This report contributes to our under-
standing of Midwest manufacturing just
as the region is emerging from its most
difficult economic period since the early
1980s. While much of the analysis here
is preliminary, precisely because Midwest
manufacturing’s difficulties are so very
recent, this research offers useful insights
to the region’s policymakers as they
plan for a future in which manufactur-
ing will remain a vibrant part of the
Midwest economy.
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